The Psychology of the Saudi Aggression and the Psychological Aspects in the Decision of the Losing Escalation Against Yemen

Zakaria Al-Sharabi |
Twelve years ago, the decision of the Saudi aggression on Yemen was launched from the assumption of the ease and speed of a decisive victory through air superiority in exchange for Yemeni internal fragmentation, the presence of mercenary parties in Yemen, and a wide process of recruitment for fighting in favor of Saudi Arabia, along with the state of weakness that the Yemeni state was suffering from in the military field. However, this war soon turned into a predicament for Riyadh that it should have reconsidered its calculations about and balanced between cost and return, as it is no longer only a war of attrition for its forces inside Yemen, but has come to touch the nerve of economic existence represented in oil and security stability.
Although Saudi Arabia obtained an opportunity to de-escalate that began in the year 2022 and extended until 2026, it did not seize this opportunity, even though it came at the time following the Yemeni Armed Forces’ proof of their field steadfastness in exchange for what is known as the inevitable decline of the offensive on the part of Saudi Arabia and its allies. This is a state that resulted from the defender’s adaptation and the building of military strategies and capabilities that brought down the elements of offensive superiority and targeted its centers of gravity, reaching a state of launching a counterattack on it on a number of important fronts and returning the attackers to point zero, as happened in the Kitaf-Al-Buqa and Al-Malahit axis, as well as the fronts of Nihm, Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia returned to escalation again, as it bombed Sana’a Airport to prevent an attempt to break the siege it imposes on Yemen, and also targeted areas with a number of airstrikes in Hudaydah